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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JANET R. COX, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, REPLY BRIEF 
-vs- Case No. 92-0818 
K. NORMAN COX, Trial Court No. 904402060 
Defendant/Appellee. Priority Classification 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT (hereinafter "plaintiff" or "wife") 
submits the following as her Reply Brief in the above-entitled 
matter: 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. There is no stipulation on file with the trial court, 
either as an exhibit, as a part of the record, or as a written 
pleading. Therefore, to the extent that the defendant's argument 
in his brief relies upon a stipulation of the parties, no such 
stipulation appears of record. Because there is no stipulation of 
record, the trial court's findings are inadequate, and the matter 
must be remanded for adequate findings. 
2. The trial court's distribution of assets was so 
inequitable as to constitute an abuse of discretion. Specifically, 
the court should have awarded plaintiff one-half the Orem 
residence. 
3. The failure of the trial court to award plaintiff alimony 
was an abuse of discretion. The trial court relied upon 
defendant's bald assertion that he was unable to work for medical 
reasons, without so much as a medical record or medical report to 
substantiate his claim, and in the face of a significant employment 
history. 
4. The trial court erred in relying upon Rule 68 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, to award defendant attorney's fees. 
5. Plaintiff should be awarded her court costs and 
attorney's fees in bringing this appeal. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS. CASES, STATUTES AND RULES 
There is no case law authority nor statutory authority 
believed by plaintiff to be wholly dispositive of the issues on 
appeal. However, Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, may 
be dispositive of one issue on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THERE IS NO STIPULATION OF RECORD 
FOR SETTLEMENT OF THIS CASE. 
Plaintiff, in her opening brief, returned to source documents 
(such as the premarital contract of the parties) to analyze the 
case. The defendant, in his brief, relies upon a stipulation which 
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is putatively of record in this matter. In fact, there is no 
stipulation of record in this case, other than non-specific 
references in the transcript to the fact that a stipulation exists. 
There is no written pleading which is a stipulation on file in this 
case. There is no exhibit marked and on file in the record in this 
case containing the stipulation. The stipulation was not made a 
part of the oral record at the time of trial, so that it would 
appear as part of the transcript. The stipulation simply does not 
exist. 
To the extent that the stipulation is a basis for the 
defendant's argument in his brief, his argument is wholly 
unsupported. To the extent that the trial court's decision in the 
matters which are the subject of this appeal relies in part on the 
stipulation forming a foundation for the court's ruling, the 
court's ruling is wholly unsupported by evidence or by stipulation 
or by adequate findings. 
This case must, therefore, be remanded for the taking of 
additional evidence, and for specific findings either to support 
the trial court's assumptions about the stipulation, or to support 
the finding that a stipulation existed. 
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POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN FAILING TO AWARD THE PLAINTIFF ONE-
HALF THE OREM RESIDENCE. 
As set forth in plaintiff's opening brief, the circumstances 
which occurred immediately before and during the marriage of the 
parties are such that the plaintiff acquired a legal interest in 
and an equitable interest in the Orem residence. This property 
interest should have been divided equally between the parties, as 
of the date of the decree of divorce. 
First of all, the trial court erred in dividing the value of 
the real property as of the date of the parties' separation in 
1990, rather than as of the date of the divorce trial in 1992. The 
court specifically made a finding regarding the value of the Orem 
property at the time of separation (Finding of Fact No. 13, R.O. 
A., 212). The court did not at any point value the home as of the 
date of the divorce. Ordinarily, property must be valued as of the 
date of divorce. Morgan v. Morgan. 854 P.2d, 559 (Ut. App., 1993). 
Defendant alleges that plaintiff stipulated to this valuation date, 
but as noted above, there is no stipulation of record. 
Defendant in his brief argues that the trial court properly 
awarded the Orem residence to the defendant, based upon a number of 
factors. First of all, defendant argues that the parties 
"stipulated" that the value of defendant7s home prior to marriage 
and prior to remodeling, was $77,000.00. This "stipulation" does 
4 
not appear in any portion of the record. 
Next, defendant argues that the court properly determined that 
the fair market value of the home at the time of separation was 
$105,000.00. As noted above, it was error for the trial court to 
value the home at the time of separation (1990) rather than at the 
time of the divorce in 1992. 
Next, defendant asserts that plaintiff's sale of her 
premarital residence and her investment of the proceeds of that 
sale into the remodeling of the defendant's home should somehow 
work in favor of the defendant receiving all of the Orem property. 
In fact, the wife's sale of her premarital residence, and her 
reinvestment of the net proceeds of that sale into the defendant's 
home, are factors favoring the validity of the deed which grants 
plaintiff a legal interest in the Orem property, and favors 
plaintiff receiving one-half interest in the Orem home. 
Defendant claims that the premarital contract of the parties, 
and the warranty deed from defendant to plaintiff argue against 
plaintiff's interest in the Orem real estate. In fact, as set 
forth in plaintiff's brief, defendant executed a warranty deed to 
plaintiff before he signed the antenuptial agreement. One day 
later, he then signed the antenuptial agreement which sets forth 
his net worth in the sum of approximately $370,000.00, but fails to 
itemize what assets comprise that net worth. In other words, the 
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home is not listed as an item making up his net worth for purposes 
of the antenuptial agreement. There is no stipulation of the 
parties to contradict the plain meaning of the antenuptial 
agreement and the warranty deed, read in conjunction with each 
other. The plain meaning, from the four corners of the two 
documents, is that plaintiff owned a full undivided one-half 
interest in the Orem residence. The trial court abused its 
discretion in failing to uphold the deed, and in failing to award 
plaintiff one-half the equity in the home as of the date of 
divorce. 
Defendant argues in his brief that he intended the warranty 
deed to secure only the plaintiff's remodeling expenditures. Had 
this been defendant's intention, the antenuptial agreement and/or 
the warranty deed could have addressed this issue specifically. 
However, the warranty deed does not make any reference to any 
particular percentage interest or dollar interest being granted to 
the plaintiff. It simply gives plaintiff an undivided one-half 
interest in the Orem home. The trial court should not have 
considered, and this Court should not consider, the defendant's 
parole evidence contradicting a written contract and written deed, 
when the plain meaning of the contract and deed are evident from 
the documents themselves. 
Defendant argues at length in his brief that this Court should 
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analyze the distribution of the Orem residence as though it were 
premarital property. This is simply not an appropriate analysis 
under the circumstances of this case. The Orem residence lost its 
character as premarital property when the defendant executed a 
warranty deed to the plaintiff prior to the parties' marriage 
granting to plaintiff an undivided one-half interest in the 
property. Further, the defendant sealed this bargain when he 
signed a premarital contract failing to specify that the residence 
be treated as premarital property. Therefore, all of the 
defendant's analysis in his brief regarding the supposed premarital 
character of the Orem real estate is simply not applicable in this 
case. The Orem home should have been treated as a marital asset. 
Defendant, in his brief, attempts to characterize the warranty 
deed as an "after-thought," as something incompatible with the 
provisions of the antenuptial agreement. In fact, as has been 
repeatedly noted by the plaintiff, the warranty deed can be read in 
a manner totally compatible with the antenuptial agreement. This 
Court can and should interpret these two documents as compatible, 
through the following analysis: the parties intended to provide 
security for the plaintiff, in the face of her sale of her 
premarital home, and intended to protect plaintiff's substantial 
investment in the remodeling of the defendant's home. Therefore, 
defendant deeded a full one-half interest in the home to plaintiff, 
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before marriage. Thereafter, the parties executed an antenuptial 
agreement which failed to mention the Orem residence at all, 
because the Orem residence was not contemplated to be a part of the 
antenuptial agreement. The antenuptial agreement disposes of all 
the rest of the defendant's property, and all the rest of the 
plaintiff's property. 
In Berman v. Berman, 749 P.2d, 1271 (Ut. App. , 1988), the Utah 
Court of Appeals held that antenuptial agreements are to be 
construed and treated in the same manner as other contracts. The 
ordinary and usual meaning of the words used are to be given 
effect, and effect is to be given to the entire agreement without 
ignoring any part of the agreement. If the court gives the 
antenuptial agreement and the warranty deed, read together, the 
interpretation proposed above by plaintiff, then the requirements 
of the Berman decision will be satisfied. 
Defendant devotes a substantial portion of his brief to an 
analysis of the question of whether a warranty deed executed 
subsequent to an antenuptial agreement abrogates the terms and 
provisions of the antenuptial agreement. This analysis is all well 
and good, but it has absolutely no application to the instant case. 
In the case now at bar, defendant executed the warranty deed before 
he executed the antenuptial agreement. Thereafter, defendant 
signed the antenuptial agreement, which also contains plain 
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language, and does not mention the real property which had earlier 
been deeded to plaintiff. Therefore, all of defendant's analysis 
about whether the warranty deed voids the antenuptial agreement is 
inapplicable to the facts of this case. 
Defendant argues in his brief that the antenuptial contract 
was executed days before the marriage and was prepared in a hurry. 
This does not affect in any way the enforceability of the 
agreement. It must still be interpreted according to the plain 
meaning of its language. Of course, if defendant wishes to claim 
the contract is void as an adhesion contract or because defendant 
was under duress when it was executed, plaintiff will stipulate 
that the contract is void. Then the warranty deed stands alone, 
granting plaintiff one-half the home. 
Defendant seems to think that plaintiff argues the antenuptial 
agreement is void, due to non-disclosure of assets. (See 
defendant's brief, page 24.) This is not the case. Plaintiff 
simply argues that the itemization of defendant's assets does not 
specify that the house in issue is included within the calculation 
of defendant's net worth at marriage. This does not void the 
contract. It makes it possible to read the warranty deed and 
contract consistently with each other. 
In summary, plaintiff should be awarded one-half the Orem 
house. 
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POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
AWARD THE PLAINTIFF ALIMONY. 
As noted in plaintiff's opening brief, under the three-prong 
analysis in Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d, 1072 (Ut. 1985), the 
plaintiff should receive alimony from the defendant, at least in 
the sum of $250.00 per month for three years, to enable plaintiff 
to retrain. 
The trial court specifically found that plaintiff was unable 
to meet her monthly obligations with her own income, and that she 
was employed full-time. In order to make ends meet, she was 
receiving assistance from her parents and from her church. 
Plaintiff satisfies two of the three requirements for receipt of 
alimony under Jones. She is in need and she cannot meet her own 
needs. 
The only prong of the Jones analysis which is truly in dispute 
is the issue of the defendant's ability to contribute to the 
plaintiff's support. Defendant notes in his brief that he became 
unemployed in October 1991 (during the pendency of this action) 
when he sold his business. Defendant asserts in his brief that his 
only income at the time of trial was $554.00 per month from 
unemployment compensation. Further, defendant contended at trial 
and contends in his brief that he suffers from a physical 
disability which precludes him from seeking full-time employment in 
his area of training. 
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internally contradictory. He states on the one hand that ho is 
receiving unemployment compensation, which, as a mattni nl I. 
regu i :i : es that I: n = t > s a :: t:::i = ] ;,; seeki rig and at) I e to accept i ull-time 
employment. Utah Code Annotatedf §35-4-4(c) i 1991 as amendec 
the alternative, ^ * -• * ^  * suffer from ; n/-
to - «• .iaor accepting t ull-time employment. 
(See paragraph «», page i oi defendant's brief), Defendant cannot 
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l :«tw •
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evidence to support his own self-serving r. opinion that ^ 
was physically disabled from employment. ^ 
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did ih't even cm o i: i*--na or Mmily member * * testify -" i-
point. He failea iu produc -.n. -
medi . i reports to ver I i
 ;, »M ^  condition. 
Plaintiff acknowledges that considerable latitude is given 
trial courts iii makincf f act.n.i I dpf pmn n ii imp il  nJ IIJSI.IIHJ 
iitnl property interests, and that the trial court's 






- *^' " —* - Jiorpe v. Qsguthorpe, 
... M i ! uiro acknowledges that this 
Court will not modify the trial court's determinations unless there 
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has been a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law, resulting 
in substantial and prejudicial error, or that the ruling is against 
the clear weight of the evidence, or that such a serious inequity 
would result as to manifest the clear abuse of discretion. Naranjo 
v. Naranjof 751 P.2d, 1144 (Ut. App., 1988). The trial court's 
determination to believe the defendant's self-serving and 
unsubstantiated claims of disability, and its determination to 
believe defendant had to quit his job and sell his business in the 
face of a pending divorce trial, manifests a clear abuse of 
discretion on the part of the trial court within the meaning of the 
Hogue decision, as to the plaintiff's alimony claim. 
The Jones decision does not preclude the court from 
considering other factors as well as the three factors set forth in 
Jones. Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d, 260 (Ut. App., 1993); and 
Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d, 669 (Ut. App., 1987). In the instant 
case, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider 
other relevant factors such as the circumstances in which defendant 
was left at the time of divorce compared to the circumstances of 
the plaintiff. Defendant was left with an unencumbered home having 
a value in excess of $100,000.00, to satisfy his housing needs. He 
was left with other assets having a value of more than $150,000.00. 
In comparison, the plaintiff was left to obtain housing through the 
assistance of her parents and her church. She was left with no 
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circumstances, her request for alimony <? >\) on per mont n rev ^ 
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defendant asks this Court to consider the sale of hi s business and 
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Defendant argues i 11 his brief, at page o.^ , chat his income W H S 
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$554.00 per month. In fact, in addition to his unemployment income 
of $554.00 per month, defendant was receiving $500.00 per month in 
contract proceeds from the sale of his business, and he had 
significant other assets. (Finding of Pact No. 19). After taxes, 
defendant and plaintiff had substantially similar net monthly 
incomes. But defendant had his housing free of costs, and had 
reserves, while plaintiff did not. 
Defendant argues in his brief that he experienced a greater 
decrease in his net worth, in terms of dollars, than did the 
plaintiff. Defendant may have suffered the loss of more money than 
the plaintiff during the course of the parties' marriage, but this 
is because he had so much more to begin with. In terms of a 
percentage of defendant's assets, defendant suffered only a thirty-
five percent loss in his net worth, as opposed to an eighty-five 
percent loss in plaintiff's net worth during the parties' marriage. 
Specifically, prior to the marriage, plaintiff had a net worth of 
$74,000.00. (Finding of Fact No. 7). At the time of the divorce, 
plaintiff's net worth was $10,539.00. (Finding of Fact No. 15). 
On the other hand, defendant's net worth at the time of marriage 
was $368,000.00. (Finding of Fact No. 7). At the time of the 
divorce, the defendant's net worth was $232,249.00. 
Plaintiff has met her burden of proof to establish that the 
trial court committed error in failing to award plaintiff alimony. 
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appropriate findings, and to award plaintiff alimony i n the sum of 
$250.00 per month for a period of three years. 
POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF PAY ATTORNEY'S 
FEES TO THE DEFENDANT. 
M l i f i i I. in i n i i aereu plaintiff to pay defendant attorney's 
fees. As noted In plaintiff/p" opening brief, the trial co^rt 
improperly applied Rule 68 ot uie Utah Rules of Civil Proceduree 
pet'iM i ni i„> | I \ I lets « I judgment, The lower court assumed that the 
plaintiff would be responsible to pay attorney's fees pursuant to 
Rule 68. In fact, Rule 68 wou 
del endii'inl i, costs, not .Attorney .» : ^ .^- . *. trial court made n, 
finding about the defendant's costs his case, 4ncurred after 
the date of the offer oi judgmer 
t ees 
Further, the trial court abused its discretior requiring 
plaintiff - ^  * 
about
 t,ay defendant s attorney's 
fees, when defendant haa - • . ! • • » ^ /4- -^ » ex. 
monthly income of $l,054.uu j. m 
expenses. 
In his brief, defendant argues that, pursuant to Utah Code 
15 
Annotatedr §30-3-3 (1989 as amended), a trial court may award 
attorney's fees in a divorce proceeding, so long as the award is 
based on evidence as to the receiving spouse's financial needs, the 
ability of the paying spouse to pay and the reasonableness of the 
award. Defendant is correct in this statement about Utah statutory 
law. However, the trial court made absolutely no findings about 
any of the factors set forth in Utah Code Annotatedr §30-3-3, and 
specifically stated that the sole basis for its award of attorney's 
fees was Rule 68. At the very least, this action should be 
remanded to the trial court for the making of adequate finding as 
to the issue of attorney's fees. Further, based upon the facts of 
this case, it was an abuse of discretion to order plaintiff to pay 
defendant's attorney's fees, even under the requirements of §30-3-
3. 
POINT V. DEFENDANT SHOULD BE ORDERED TO PAY 
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY'S FEES IN 
THIS APPEAL. 
Plaintiff seeks an award of her attorney's fees in this 
appeal. The trial court has abused its discretion, and committed 
plain error in the interpretation of Utah law. Plaintiff should be 
awarded the attorney's fees she has incurred on appeal. Bell v. 
Bell, 810 P.2d, 489 (Ut. App. , 1991), and Crouse v. Crouse, 817 
P.2d, 836 (Ut. App., 1991). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court in 
this matter should be reversed, This Court should reman r1 * h i i* 
m a t t e r 
1. For the triai mrt ! ; make a specific rinding 
about the stipulatior * -^  - -arties, including spec + 
2. 1-)T entry judgment awarding Li plaintiff 
alimony ^ w? ^ $250.00 * er month 
ihr^e yea" , H ' I P M I «"<« I nctober 1992; and 
3. For entry of a judgment awarding the plaintiff rv>t>~ 
half of the parties7 right, title and i 
i er; i ill Hi:* • i I I h*.j *1<I1.I.J ul ^nt ry ol •«*- d e c r e e •.  v d i v o r c e ; 
and 
4. For entrv oi an ordei <-
pieviuii.s .IWI-IMI r»l attorney's fee--.- :o defendant; and 
5. For an order awarding - fr plaintiff her court costs 
and attorney's fees incurred in tins appeal i mi 
t e cie t e i iii r H M Ill Ill t I t h e c o u r t . 
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/3 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS / s day of September, 1993. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
MARY C. CORPORON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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BYRON FISHER 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
Twelfth Floor 
215 State, P.O. Box 510210 
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